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Abstract 
There are many existing studies characterizing the informal sector in Latin America, but 
the literature fails to fully examine the interactions between gender and disadvantaging 
factors on the probability of informal employment and its returns to wage. This analysis 
uses survey data from Argentina (2001) and Uruguay (2006) to examine the 
heterogeneous effects of number of children under 5, education, minority status, and 
migrant status on male and female informal employment and income. Being female 
interacts with number of children under 5 to create no effect on probability of informal 
employment, in contrast to a significant negative effect for men. Education has a greater 
negative effect on probability of informal work for females, while minority status and 
migrant status have a greater positive effect on the probability of being employed 
informally for females. Additionally, working informally is associated with a negative 
effect on wage for both females and males, but this effect is less for females. Number of 
children under 5 also negatively affects female wages, while there is no such effect for 
men. 
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1. Introduction 
 In most developing countries, the informal sector is an integral, if not the largest, 
segment of the economy, characterized by individuals working in small-scale, low-
productivity jobs (Gasparini and Tornarolli, 2009). The informal sector primarily 
includes mostly poor workers, and participation in this sector is often associated with 
“low and volatile earnings,” meaning that informal workers are often making less than 
the formal sector and have a less-than-steady stream of income (Gunther and Launov, 
2012). Although scholars debate whether the relationship between informal work and 
income is causal (Maloney, 2004), there is a strong link between informal employment 
and poverty. This has made the informal sector a significant subject of research for those 
who are interested in poverty reduction (Beccaria and Groisman, 2008), entrepreneurship 
(Maloney, 2004), or policy changes to enable personal and economic growth (Chen, 
2001). 
 There has been significant past research in measuring and defining the informal 
sectors of developing countries, specifically in Latin America. In a comprehensive 
analysis of the informal sectors of multiple Central American countries, Funkhouser 
(1996) finds that the informal sector is “the youngest, the oldest, the least educated, and 
female.” Funkhouser also finds a high return to education on income and a higher male-
to-female earnings differential in the informal sector than the formal sector. However, he 
finds that the disproportionate employment of women in the informal sector coupled with 
the lower earnings differential suggests that there are significant barriers to mobility 
within this sector for women. 
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Past research has looked at the informal sectors of Argentina and Uruguay 
specifically but has not deeply analyzed the influence of factors within their female 
populations, at most analyzing only the simple variable of gender on informal 
employment. Portes et. al. (1986) find that, at their time of research, the Uruguayan 
informal sector encompassed 20% of their survey respondents, and that the probability of 
informal employment was additionally influenced by race and sex, not just skill. 
Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009) found that the share of informal workers in the overall 
labor force in Argentina between 1995 and 2005 ranged between 41% and 46%, while 
proportion of informal workers from the adult female population ranged from 40% to 
45%. In Uruguay, they found that the informal share of the workforce ranged from 35% 
in 1992 to 44% in 2003, with adult female proportions of 43% in 1995 and 1998 and 51% 
in 2003. Beccaria and Groisman (2008) find that Argentinian informal employees earn 
only 60% to 70% of income comparted to formal sector employees, suggesting a close 
relationship between the informal sector and poverty. However, they do not analyze the 
impact of gender within this sector.  
Funkhouser (1996) does include interaction variables of gender and other qualities 
in his analysis of several Central American countries, but he focuses on the effects of the 
interaction between gender and marital status and its effect on the probability of informal 
employment. He also focuses on the earnings differential between men and women in the 
informal sector, noting that it is much larger than that of the formal sector, and states that 
this, compiled with disproportionate female employment in the informal sector found in 
his analysis, “suggests that barriers to mobility, and refuge employment in the informal 
sector, may be important for females.” Funkhouser does not look at the effects of other 
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potentially disadvantaging qualities and their interactions with gender to affect the 
probability of informal employment, despite the possibility that additional interaction 
variables could be significant in a similar analysis and help characterize the role of 
intersectionality in informal sector employment. Overall, the economic research that I 
was able to find did not delve far beyond the simple effect of only being female on the 
propensity to be informally employed. 
 The lack of nuance within the female portions of these analyses on informal 
employment suggests that there is room for further economic research on the 
compounding effects of gender and other disadvantaging factors in choosing informal 
work and the returns to income through this sector. Women are disproportionately 
employed in the informal sector globally, and informal sector work and poverty are often 
intertwined (Chen 2001). The concept of intersectionality suggests that gender can 
interact with other variables that characterize many informal sector employees, such as 
race and low education, to generate additional disadvantage and higher propensity of 
low-income, informal employment. Researchers in the fields of sociology and political 
science have examined women’s participation in the informal sector in Latin America 
and attempted to examine the influences of individual and societal characteristics on the 
structure of the informal and formal labor markets (Cantu, 2017; Sautu 1980; Chen 
2001). Evidence of compounding effects between gender and other characteristics on the 
individual level can contribute to the current debate surrounding the nature of informal 
work and whether women are choosing to be employed in the informal sector, or 
confined by barriers to the formal sector. 
9 
 
Heterogeneity of the informal sector is often emphasized in existing literature. 
Although this study attempts to identify trends and causal factors on informal 
employment and income, the informal sector in Latin America is not a homogenous 
block. In the past, the informal sector was characterized as individuals seeking insecure 
jobs as their only option to unemployment. However, recent research has emphasized that 
there is evidence of a more entrepreneurial portion of the informal sector (Caneiro, 2009; 
Maloney, 2004). Although the simple metric of informal/formal employment does not 
capture the nuance of the informal sector, evidence of intersectionality between gender 
and other disadvantaging characteristics in predicting informal employment can be 
indicative of barriers that exist to formal employment to these groups. Additionally, 
evidence of wage premiums for informal employees of certain groups could help shed 
light on whether these groups are voluntarily remaining informal sector employees. 
This study finds evidence of heterogeneous effects of the number of young 
children, education, and minority and migrant status on females compared to males on 
probability of informal employment. Although males are more likely to work in the 
formal sector for each additional child under the age of 5, additional children under the 
age of 5 has no impact on the probability of informal work for women. The impact of a 
year of education, additionally, has almost double the negative impact on the probability 
of being informally employed on females compared to males. There is a significant 
impact of being a minority on the female population in increasing the probability of 
informal work, while there is an opposite or no effect for men. Migrant women are much 
more likely to be informally employed than migrant men by a gap of approximately 12 
percentage points.  
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 Additionally, this study finds that number of young children and participation in 
the informal sector have different effects on female income than on male income. Being 
an informal worker has a downward effect on wage for both men and women, but the 
effect is of a lesser magnitude for females. The interaction of being female and number of 
children under 5 has an additional negative penalty to wage, while number of children 
under 5 has no effect on men. The interactions between being female and minority status, 
as well as being female and migrant status, have no significant impact on wage. Minority 
status on its own, however, has a significant negative effect on income for both males and 
females. 
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2. Methods and Data 
2.1 Methods 
 This study begins with several two-sample t-tests on differences between the male 
and female samples and the informal and formal worker samples. These simple means 
tests serve the purpose of identifying interesting trends, but other factors influence the 
probability of being informally employed. The study then moves to several OLS 
multivariate regression analyses in which the variables of interest are examined in the 
entire sample, in gender-separated samples, and in the entire sample with their 
interactions on gender included. 
2.2 Data 
 The data used in this study are from the 2001 Argentina National Population, 
Households, and Dwellings Census (NPHDC), conducted by the National Institute of 
Statistics and Censuses, and the 2006 Uruguay Extended National Survey of Homes 
(ENHA), a probability sample conducted by the National Institute of Statistics. Both were 
accessed through the IPUMS International user database. The entire NPHDC dataset 
reflects 3,883,969 individuals, and the ENHA contains information on 256,866 
individuals. These studies, while not the most recent available censuses, were chosen on 
the basis that they included information on the size of place of employment, a key 
variable used to define inclusion in the informal sector. Both studies contain information 
on, among other variables, age, sex, marital status, educational attainment by year and by 
level, native-born status, head of household, and industry of employment. The NPHDC 
additionally contains information on country of birth, and the ENHA contains 
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information on race, indigenous status, and income. Due to the nature of the samples, not 
every respondent includes a response for each variable. 
2.3 Variable Definitions 
 This study uses categorization of workers by the “productivity” definition of the 
informal sector outlined in Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009) to define the informal sector: 
Individuals are considered a part of the informal sector if he or she is unskilled 
self-employed, a salaried worker in a small private firm, or a zero income worker. 
This definition is consistent with the reasoning used in other microeconomic studies on 
the informal sector (Funkhouser 1996; Henley & Arabsheibani 2008). In this definition, 
unskilled self-employment implies that the individual is both not working for a well-
established, productive firm and that he or she does not have superior education 
necessary to work as a professional or technician. According to Gasparini and Tornarolli 
(2009), small firms are often run by those who are self-employed, and are usually using 
primitive technology and operating at low productivity, which are considered defining 
characteristics of informal labor. The number cutoff in identifying small places of 
employment for the purpose of identifying informal workers can range depending on the 
survey, but are often defined as having 5 employees or less (Caneiro, 2009; Funkhouser, 
1996).  Due to differences in survey questions, small places of employment are defined as 
having between 1-5 employees in Argentina and 1-4 employees in Uruguay. The variable 
in the data that contains the size of work establishment includes only private sector 
employees and persons age 14 and over for both NHPDC and ENHA. Additionally, 
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skilled self-employment is implied if the individual has a tertiary degree; those who have 
completed university are, therefore, classified as formal workers.  
Zero-income work, according to Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009), often indicates 
that the person works in a family-based enterprise and receives non-monetary 
compensation and other non-formal payment. This data set uses information on monthly 
income, in which zero-income work can also indicate the wage volatility that is often 
associated with informal employment. Because of this, a response of “0” for last month’s 
income indicates informal employment. Individuals meeting criteria to be classified 
within one of these three defining categories are indicated as an informal worker in the 
variable Informal (Inf).  
Labor force non-participants are removed from this metric. Labor force 
participation is determined in the NPHDC by asking if the individual either worked last 
week, or if they were looking for work in the last four weeks. Text information for the 
question on labor force participation in the ENHA was unavailable and unclear exactly 
what methodology was used to determine labor force participation from the survey; 
however, I assume that it was likely determined through indicators similar to those used 
in the NPHDC, as surveys often determine labor force participation through whether the 
individual worked or is looking for work.1 For the purpose of simply excluding those 
who do not work from the informality metric, which is determined mostly by size of 
                                                          
1 For example, the Uruguay 2011 census asks, “During the past week, did (Name) work for at least an 
hour? Did the [the respondent] do something outside the household, or helped in a business or collaborated 
in the care of animals, crops, or gardens that were not for self-consumption? Even though [the respondent] 
didn't work last week, does [the respondent] have some work or business that [the respondent] will surely 
return to? During the last four weeks, was [the respondent] looking for work or trying to establish a 
business?” The Uruguay 1996 census asks, “During the past week, did you work at least one hour?” 
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place of work, I chose to continue to use the ENHA labor force variable to define 
informal and formal workers. 
Other variables of interest to be interacted with gender and control variables are a 
female dummy (Female or F), number of children under 5 years (Children Under 5 or 
N5), age, education in terms of years of schooling (Years of School or Yrs) and 
educational level attainment (primary school, secondary school, etc.), race (Minority or 
Min), migration status (Migrant or Mig), head of household status, and income (Income 
or Inc). Number of children under 5 years reflects the number of the individual’s own 
children that are under the age of 5.  
Race, a variable available only from the ENHA, has been constructed into the 
dummy variable Minority, which indicates 0 as the Uruguayan racial majority (white) and 
indicates 1 as a non-white racial minority, including those of two or more races. Migrant 
is a dummy variable constructed from data on whether or not the person is a native, 1 
indicating that they did not immediately live in their country of residence after birth. 
Information on migration was only collected during the 4th trimester of the ENHA 
survey, so the number of responses to the variable Migrant are limited in Uruguay. 
Income data is also only available from the ENHA, and reflects the total amount 
of income earned for that individual from their highest-paying job last month in 
Uruguayan pesos. The conversion rate of Uruguayan pesos to dollars on December 31, 
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2006 was 24.37 pesos to 1 dollar,2 which is used to contextualize the results with an 
approximate dollar value.  
2.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 1A 
Summary: Entire Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
      
Children under 5 3,883,969 0.160 0.472 0 9 
Age 3,883,969 31.60 22.23 0 100 
Yrs of School 3,682,864 7.376 4.668 0 18 
Wage last month 
(Uruguayan pesos) 
256,866 1,659 4,261 0 180,000 
Racial Minority 255,978 0.126 0.332 0 1 
Migrant 3,690,112 0.0419 0.200 0 1 
Head of HH 3,883,969 0.281 0.450 0 1 
Informal 729,096 0.506 0.500 0 1 
      
 
Table 1B 
Summary: Included in Informal Metric 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
      
Children under 5 729,096 0.260 0.564 0 7 
Age 729,096 37.79 13.57 15 99 
Yrs of School 729,091 9.536 3.950 0 18 
Wage last month 
(Uruguayan pesos) 
93,146 3,146 5,342 0 180,000 
Racial Minority 92,824 0.119 0.323 0 1 
Migrant 659,692 0.0584 0.235 0 1 
Head of HH 729,096 0.505 0.500 0 1 
Informal 729,096 0.506 0.500 0 1 
      
 
                                                          
2 The historical conversion rate was found on www.xe.com/currencytables. 
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Table 1A displays the summary statistics for the entire combined sample of 
NPHDC and ENHA, while Table 1B contains the same summary statistics for the smaller 
sample of only those who do not have a “missing” value for the variable Informal. This is 
the sample used in the majority of analyses in this study. Several means change in the 
second table; the average number of children under five, age, average years of school, 
average wage last month, and proportion that are head of household all increase. 
However, these changes are all likely due to the removal of children under the age of 14 
from the informality metric. The proportion of racial minorities in the sample decreases 
by 0.7 percentage points, or 5.55%, and the proportion of migrants as a share of the 
sample increases by 1.65 percentage points, or 39.38%. When a t-test is run on these 
differences in proportions, they are both found to be significant at the 1% level. 3 
Because the proportion of racial minorities only changes by around 5%, the 
magnitude of this change is not very concerning. However, the proportion of migrants in 
the sample increases by quite a large amount, becoming over a third larger. One possible 
reason for this increase is that migrants in the sample may tend to be working adults 
rather than children, so a smaller proportion of migrants compared to natives are removed 
from the sample when it is restricted to those who work in the informality metric. When a 
t-test is run on the average ages of the migrant sample versus the native sample, we find 
that the migrant sample is significantly older by an average of 18.17 years.4 This implies 
that a higher proportion of the migrant population is in the labor force, and less migrants 
                                                          
3 Results of this t-test are shown in Appendix Table 1. 
4 Results of this t-test are shown in Appendix Table 2. 
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are removed when the sample is restricted to this metric. This explains why this 
proportion of migrants in the informality metric is significantly higher. 
Table 2 
Proportions of All, Male, and Female workers in each industry by informal/formal sector 
 All Male Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
       
Agriculture, Fishing, 
Forestry 
16.15 7.82 24.54 10.00 5.37 3.06 
Mining 0.14 0.85 0.23 1.14 0.02 0.22 
Manufacturing 9.40 20.98 12.38 24.45 5.58 13.38 
Electricity, gas, water 0.33 1.56 0.48 1.86 0.13 0.89 
Construction 5.18 4.39 9.05 6.09 0.22 0.65 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
23.39 17.05 26.62 16.61 19.25 18.01 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 
3.29 3.98 3.15 3.48 3.47 5.06 
Transportation, 
storage, and 
communication 
5.59 10.42 8.66 12.96 1.65 4.85 
Financial services 
and insurance 
0.54 3.29 0.49 2.75 0.59 4.48 
Public administration 
and defense 
0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.11 
Real estate and 
business services 
4.82 8.35 4.84 7.74 4.80 9.68 
Education 0.81 5.61 0.30 1.71 1.47 14.17 
Health and social 
work 
1.63 6.01 0.49 2.76 3.10 13.14 
Other services 4.54 4.60 4.60 4.28 4.45 5.30 
Private household 
services 
21.15 .45 1.52 .21 46.36 0.97 
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Table 2 shows the proportion of workers in each industry by gender and 
formal/informal sector. Almost half of women working in the informal sector (46.36%) 
are working in private household services, which is consistent with literature on labor 
markets of Latin American countries—women typically have the “worst” jobs in the 
informal sector, working in “precarious” domestic or household work, often for little or 
no payment (Abramo and Valenzuela, 2005). In contrast, the highest proportions of males 
working in the informal sector are working in wholesale and retail trade and agriculture. 
 Small portions of informal workers are in industries that would often be 
considered formal lines of work, such as financial services and insurance, or public 
administration and defense. There are several explanations for why these workers could 
be considered informal: first, since an important aspect of the construction of the 
informality variable is simply the size of the place of employment, it is possible that 
several individuals working in small, formal places of employment are considered 
informal in this sample; second, the way that industry is determined in the sample is 
through the individual’s description of their job, where it is then categorized into the 
assumed industry—it is possible that a disconnect between job description and actual job 
function led some individuals to be classified in a “formal” industry when they are not; 
lastly, individuals working in these sectors may still be informal, but may be sub-
contractors to the formal sector (Funkhouser, 1996). 
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3. Analysis 
3.1 Informality: Two-Sample Means Tests 
This study begins analysis with a series of two-sample means tests between the 
male/female and native/migrant samples. Each test is testing against the null 
hypothesis that the means of the male and female samples or the native and migrant 
samples for that variable are equal.  
Table 3A 
T-test results for male & female mean comparisons 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Male Mean Female 
Mean 
Difference 
    
Percent informal .456 .589 -.132*** 
(.001) 
Percent informal if 
migrant 
.444 .725 -.281*** 
(.005) 
Percent informal if 
minority 
.625 .714 -.088*** 
(.009) 
Yrs of school if 
informal 
8.181 8.569 -.388*** 
(.012) 
Yrs of school if 
formal 
10.100 12.169 -2.069*** 
(.014) 
 
Table 3A shows the results of several t-tests comparing differences between the 
male and female populations. The differences between males and females for each 
variable above is significant at the one-percent level.  
Overall, the proportion of women working in the informal sector is much greater 
than the proportion of men, with women being 13.2 percentage points, or 28.9%, more 
likely to be an informal worker. When looking at the migrant population, this difference 
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more than doubles, with migrant women being 28.1 percentage points, or 63.3%, more 
likely to be an informal worker than migrant men. This is driven by the large proportion 
of the female migrant population working in the informal sector, in which it jumps to 
72.5% of migrant women from 58.9% of all women. 
There are several possible reasons why migrant women may be more inclined to 
work in the informal sector than migrant men. First, women’s reasons for migrating often 
center on their desire to better their family more than helping themselves (Pedraza 1991), 
which may lead them to be more accepting of “undesirable” jobs. Additionally, migrant 
women may lack language skills or years of schooling to compete with natives for formal 
sector jobs. To shed more light on this second hypothesis, Table 3B analyzes the 
difference in education between migrant and non-migrant female populations in this 
sample. 
Table 3B 
T-test results for years of school between natives and migrants 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Native Mean Migrant 
Mean 
Difference 
    
Females 10.247 9.116 1.135*** 
(.032) 
Males 9.363 8.957 .406*** 
(.0274) 
Note: The tests in this table are restricted to only individuals with a value for the informality metric. 
The results in Table 3B show that native females have, on average, 1.135 more 
years of schooling than migrant females, and native males have, on average, 0.406 more 
years of schooling than migrant males. For both males and females, migrants have lower 
education than natives, but this trend is of a greater magnitude for females. Because 
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migrant women experience a greater educational gap compared to natives than their male 
counterparts, they may be facing more educational barriers to entering the formal sector, 
while migrant men may not have the same barriers. 
In Table 3A, a similar trend appears when analyzing the difference between male 
and female minority workers. 71.4% of minority female workers are informal workers, 
again much higher than the overall proportion of women informal workers at 58.9%. 
However, in contrast to the proportion of male migrant workers, which was almost the 
same as the overall proportion of men in the informal sector, the proportion of minority 
men working in the informal sector is greater than the overall proportion of men in the 
informal sector at 62.5% compared to 45.6%. The difference between the proportions of 
minority female and male informal workers is then only an 8.8 percentage point 
difference, which is smaller than the gap between the overall populations of men and 
women. This suggests that being a racial minority affects men and women in similar 
ways, and has similar effects on the propensity to work in the informal sector. These 
differences suggest that there may be either racial discrimination in the formal workplace, 
creating a barrier to entry for minorities, or that racial minorities have other 
disadvantages that lead them to seek informal employment. 
In the informal sector, males and females have similar levels of schooling at 8.181 
years and 8.569 years of schooling, respectively. In contrast, men in the formal sector 
have, on average, 10.1 years of schooling, and women in the formal sector have 12.169 
years of schooling. Both male and female informal workers have, typically, no secondary 
education, while male and female formal workers have at least some high school 
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education. However, the average female formal worker has a high school diploma, while 
the average male formal worker has only a few years of high school. This suggests that 
the educational barrier for entry into the formal sector may be higher for women, 
providing a possible explanation for why there is a greater proportion of women 
employed in the informal sector. 
To explore this idea of different educational barriers in the formal sector for males 
and females, Table 3C shows the difference in informal sector participation at different 
educational milestones. 
Table 3C 
T-test results for informal participation by sex and education 
level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Male Mean Female 
Mean 
Difference 
    
Zero Schooling .590 .841 -.251*** 
(.008) 
Less than Primary .602 .820 -.218*** 
(.003) 
Primary Completed .509 .752 -.243*** 
(.002) 
Secondary Completed .401 .463 -.062*** 
(.002) 
 
For all milestones of education below “Secondary Completed,” women are 
significantly more likely than men to be working in the informal sector. Once primary 
school is completed, both men and women become slightly less likely to work in the 
informal sector, but the drop in probability is greater for men than women, causing the 
gap between percentage of males and females in the informal sector to rise to a 24.3 
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percentage point, or 47.7%, difference. However, once secondary school is completed, 
this gap greatly narrows to a 6.2 percentage point difference, and women become only 
15.5% more likely to be working in the informal sector. This provides evidence for the 
idea that women have more barriers to working in the informal sector than men if they 
have less than a high school education. 
3.2 Informality: Regression Analysis 
Table 4 includes the results from several multivariate regressions of the control 
variables on the probability of being an informal worker. The regressions include either 
minority status, migrant status, or both in order to showcase the difference in coefficients 
within the varying sample sizes created by the availability of the variables Minority and 
Migrant. The three regressions are modeled by the equations: 
(1) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + β4𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
(2) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
(3) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + β4𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
where the i subscript denotes the individual and 𝜃′is a vector containing the control 
variables age, marital status, head of household dummy, and province fixed effects.  
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Table 4 
Dependent variable: Informal=1, both genders 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Minority 
Included 
Migrant 
Included 
Minority & 
Migrant 
Female 0.0807*** 0.148*** 0.0774*** 
 (0.00355) (0.00135) (0.00704) 
Children under 5 -0.00172 -0.0188*** -0.0145** 
 (0.00342) (0.00108) (0.00694) 
Yrs of School -0.0352*** -0.0358*** -0.0345*** 
 (0.000453) (0.000156) (0.000915) 
Minority 0.00442  0.00287 
 (0.00466)  (0.00926) 
Migrant  0.0771*** 0.0361* 
  (0.00250) (0.0214) 
Constant 0.684*** 0.689*** 0.663*** 
 (0.00757) (0.00341) (0.0151) 
    
Observations 92,819 659,690 23,732 
R-squared 0.133 0.135 0.132 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 The individuals in the Uruguay sample are 10.4% more likely to be informal 
workers, controlling for all other variables.5 This suggests that there are likely structural 
qualities about the country of Uruguay that influence formal work opportunities and 
barriers for the entire population, but these qualities may be harder to observe or define in 
a household survey. Additionally, the coefficients for many provinces when controlling 
for location fixed effects are quite large, suggesting that there may be several omitted or 
unobserved variables relating to residents of different provinces. 
 For each of the analyses, female has a positive coefficient of at least .077, 
                                                          
5 Full results of the regressions in Table 4, including a regression using “country” as a control in place of 
province fixed effects, are shown in Appendix Table 3. Full results of the regressions in Tables 5A and 5B 
are shown in Appendix Tables 4 and 5. 
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meaning that being female reasonably increases the probability of being an informal 
employee. This is in line with previous research, which has found that females are more 
likely to be working in the informal sector (Funkhouser, 1996; Henley and Arabshibani, 
2008; Portes et. al., 1986). Each year of school is associated with a lower probability of 
working informally, which is in line with past research that finds that the informal sector 
tends to be less educated (Funkhouser, 1996; Portes et. al., 1986). 
 Being a racial minority does not significantly influence informal sector 
probability when included as a variable on its own in the total regression. Being a 
migrant, when on its own, is positively associated with an increase in probability of being 
an informal worker but, when minority status is also controlled for, becomes significant 
only at the 10% level. Also, when only minority status is controlled for, number of 
children under 5 no longer becomes significant, but becomes significant at the 5% level 
once migrant status is controlled for. 
 Tables 5A and 5B show the results of similar regressions to Table 4, but 
separately on the male and female samples to isolate the effects of the variables on the 
genders separately. The regressions are represented by the equations: 
(4) (7) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + β3𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
(5) (8) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
(6) (9) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + β3𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
where the i subscript denotes the individual and 𝜃′is a vector containing the control 
variables age, marital status, head of household dummy, and province fixed effects.   
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Table 5A 
Dependent variable: Informal=1, Males 
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Minority 
Included 
Migrant 
Included 
Minority & 
Migrant 
    
Children under 5 -0.00147 -0.0150*** -0.0139 
 (0.00449) (0.00133) (0.00914) 
Yrs of School -0.0272*** -0.0266*** -0.0269*** 
 (0.000616) (0.000203) (0.00125) 
Minority -0.00167  0.00165 
 (0.00617)  (0.0122) 
Migrant  0.0206*** 0.0323 
  (0.00341) (0.0298) 
Constant 0.600*** 0.613*** 0.582*** 
 (0.00975) (0.00438) (0.0194) 
    
Observations 55,450 413,204 14,132 
R-squared 0.103 0.081 0.106 
 
Table 5B 
Dependent variable: Informal=1, Females 
 (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Minority 
Included 
Migrant 
Included 
Minority & 
Migrant 
    
Children under 5 0.00416 -0.0170*** -0.00906 
 (0.00525) (0.00188) (0.0107) 
Yrs of School -0.0460*** -0.0504*** -0.0448*** 
 (0.000659) (0.000239) (0.00133) 
Minority 0.0144**  0.00338 
 (0.00703)  (0.0140) 
Migrant  0.141*** 0.0315 
  (0.00356) (0.0301) 
Constant 0.893*** 0.994*** 0.864*** 
 (0.0119) (0.00529) (0.0241) 
    
Observations 37,369 246,486 9,600 
R-squared 0.189 0.216 0.182 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
For females, the number of children becomes insignificant when controlling for 
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migrant and minority status, a trend also seen in the male sample but not in the sample 
with both genders. Years of school for females remains significant at a greater magnitude 
than for males; each increase of one year of education is associated with a 4.48 
percentage point drop in probability of being an informal worker for females, while it is 
only associated with a 2.69 percentage point drop in probability for males.  
Minority has a positive effect on probability of being informally employed for 
females only, increasing the probability of being informally employed by 1.44 percentage 
points. Migrant has a significant effect on the probability of being informally employed 
for both men and women, but while migrant men experience only a 2.06 percentage point 
increase in probability, women experience a staggering 14.1 percentage point increase in 
the probability of being informally employed. 
For both males and females, neither minority nor migrant status becomes 
significant once both are controlled for. These effects, however, are likely due to the 
changes in sample size and inclusion of only individuals in Uruguay.6 
 Table 6 presents the results of four regressions on the probability of being 
informally employed, each with the inclusion of an interaction variable. The regressions 
are represented by the following equations: 
(10) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑁5𝑖+ 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
(11) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖+ 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
(12) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + β4𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖+ 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
                                                          
6 See Appendix Table 7 for results of regression on the restricted sample.  
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(13) 𝐼𝑛𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖+ 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
where the i subscript denotes the individual and 𝜃′is a vector containing the control 
variables age, marital status, head of household dummy, and province fixed effects.  
Table 6 includes the regressions for the entire applicable samples, but includes 
interaction variables for crosses between gender and number of children under 5, years of 
school, minority status, and migrant status. The interaction variables are separated in 
order to isolate the effects in the different sample sizes. 
 In this set of regressions, each interaction variable is significant at the 1% level. 
For number of children under 5, minority status, and migrant status, the coefficients are 
positive, suggesting that the interaction between being female and these variables 
increase an individual’s probability of being employed in the informal sector. For the 
interaction between female and years of school, the coefficient is negative. 
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Table 6 
Dependent Variable: Informal=1, Includes Interactions 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES Children 
Interaction 
Education 
Interaction 
Minority 
Interaction 
Migrant 
Interaction 
     
Female 0.139*** 0.368*** 0.0759*** 0.140*** 
 (0.00135) (0.00306) (0.00374) (0.00138) 
Children Under 5 -0.0240*** -0.0164*** -0.00174 -0.0187*** 
 (0.00122) (0.00104) (0.00342) (0.00108) 
Yrs of School -0.0360*** -0.0271*** -0.0352*** -0.0356*** 
 (0.000149) (0.000184) (0.000453) (0.000156) 
Female*N5 0.0227***    
 (0.00216)    
Female*Yrs School  -0.0229***   
  (0.000283)   
Minority   -0.0106*  
   (0.00593)  
Female*Minority   0.0382***  
   (0.00931)  
Migrant    0.0211*** 
    (0.00330) 
Female*Migrant    0.128*** 
    (0.00493) 
Constant 0.693*** 0.613*** 0.686*** 0.688*** 
 (0.00327) (0.00339) (0.00758) (0.00341) 
     
Observations 729,091 729,091 92,819 659,690 
R-squared 0.139 0.147 0.133 0.135 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 The first regression in Table 6 shows that the coefficient on Children Under 5  
has a significant negative effect of 2.4 percentage points on the probability of working 
informally, while Female*N5 has a significant positive effect of 2.27 percentage points. 
This means that, for males, each additional child under 5 decreases their probability of 
informal employment by 2.4 percentage points, while, for females, the effect is canceled 
out and the net effect of each child under 5 on the probability of being informally 
employed is -0.13 percentage points. When we compare this result to the female-only 
regression in Table 5B, the effect of Children Under 5 is not significant, indicating no 
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effect. This is surprising considering that, since women are typically the caretakers of 
small children, we might expect children to have a larger effect on employment decisions 
like formal or informal employment. However, this difference in coefficients may reflect 
that men have greater opportunity to move into the formal sector if they have more small 
children, whereas women lack this option. This could also be indicative of gender-
defined barriers that exist for mothers of small children, that they have greater obstacles 
for seeking more stable forms of employment than fathers of small children. 
 For each additional year of schooling, the male probability of being an informal 
worker decreases by 2.7 percentage points. For females, this effect is even greater, with 
the coefficient on the Female*Years of School interaction term decreasing a woman’s 
probability of being informally employed by an additional 2.3 percentage points. This net 
effect is that for each year of schooling, a woman’s probability of being informally 
employed decreases by a total of 5 percentage points, a rather large effect. This shows 
that education level has a greater influence on which sector women work in than men, 
which supports the hypothesis considered earlier that women have greater educational 
barriers to entering the formal sector. As presented earlier, the mean education level of a 
female worker in the formal sector is 2.07 years greater than the mean education level of 
a male worker in the formal sector. Women with lower levels of education are either not 
selecting formal employment or limited in their opportunities. However, this coefficient 
also showcases the potential that increasing education has for expanding ability to enter 
the formal sector. 
It is possible that formal sector employers may place higher standards when hiring 
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women, expecting them to have completed their secondary education, on average, to 
perform the job while not upholding the same standard for men. It is also possible that the 
types of the jobs in the formal sector that are more accessible to women require a higher 
level of education. As seen in Table 2, which displays the proportions of men and women 
working in different industries in the informal and formal sectors, the most frequent 
industry of employment for men in the formal sector is overwhelmingly manufacturing, 
capturing 24.45% of the male formal workforce. Formally employed women are around 
as likely to work in the education (14.17%) and health and social work (13.14%) 
industries as they are to work in manufacturing (13.38%), and they are most likely to 
work in wholesale and retail trade (18.01%). Because the education and health and social 
work sectors often require a higher level of education, or at least a secondary degree, this 
could help explain why education increases the probability of formal sector work more 
for women, and why it appears that women have more educational barriers to entering the 
formal sector.  
It is unclear whether two of the types of industries that formally employed males 
typically work in—1. manufacturing and 2. transportation, storage, and communication—
are less popular for women because women are excluded from these industries or that 
women choose not to work in these sectors. It is likely that it is a combination; both of 
these industries typically involve more physical labor than the sectors that formal female 
employees typically work in. For some women, an informal job that has fewer physical 
demands may be preferred to a more physically demanding formal sector job. 
Conversely, employers in the manufacturing and transportation, storage, and 
communication industries may judge women as being unfit for physical jobs, and societal 
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norms of industry gender roles may prevent women from seeking employment in these 
sectors in the first place.  
The effect of being a minority on informal employment for men is negative, 
which is not the expected sign. However, it is relatively small, decreasing the probability 
by only 1 percentage point, and significant at only the 10% level. Minority was not 
significant when regressed in the male-only sample, so it is likely that this effect is weak. 
For women, however, this effect is much larger, positive, and significant at the 1% level. 
Females that are non-white have a net increase of 2.8 percentage points on the probability 
of informal employment, while men do not share this same trend. To test the robustness 
of this result, I ran a regression where the interaction variable between female and years 
of school is also included. The effect of the interaction between female and minority 
status remains around the same level and significant at the 5% level.7 
Minority status may affect women differently because racial discrimination may 
exacerbate existing barriers to entry that women already experience to formal sector 
entry. Prejudice against racial minorities could also affect the way that they are hired for 
jobs that require secondary school completion, which likely make up many of the jobs in 
the formal sectors that women are most frequently employed in. 
For the interaction of gender on migrant status, the results from Table 6 are 
almost the same as in the male and female split regressions in Tables 5A and 5B. Both 
the coefficients of Migrant and Female*Migrant are their expected sign, positive, and 
significant at the 1% level. While migrant men experience only a 2.11 percentage point 
                                                          
7 Results from this regression are shown in Appendix Table 9. 
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increase in probability of being informally employed (a large increase in itself), migrant 
women are 14.9 percentage points more likely to be informally employed than non-
migrant women.  
This result goes along with earlier mean comparisons and previous literature that 
show that migrant women are more likely than non-migrants and migrant men to be 
informally employed. As mentioned earlier, women often have different reasons for 
migration than men, centering on betterment of their family rather than their own 
personal betterment, and women typically migrate rather than men for better work 
opportunities in Latin America. This may lead them to accept more precarious 
employment in the informal sector, often in private household services, where there is a 
high demand for labor (Cantu, 2017).8 The informal sector can serve as an opportunity 
for migrant women to receive better opportunity for employment than in their home 
country. However, there are also likely barriers to working in the formal sector, such as 
legal working status and language, that can compound on the existing barriers that 
women face from moving into the formal sector and make it difficult for migrant women 
to secure formal employment. In this way, informal employment may serve as a “last 
resort” for migrant women that are currently in the labor force and have few other 
employment options. 
3.3 Income: Regression Analysis 
 After looking at the interactions of gender on number of young children, 
                                                          
8 Female migrants in Argentina specifically are often from Paraguay and Bolivia, and the proportion of 
domestic workers that are migrants in Argentina grew from 13.8% in 1995 to 40.1% after 1996 (Cantu, 
2017). 
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education, minority status and migrant status on probability of being informally 
employed, we now turn to look at how these factors might influence wages. Table 7 
shows the results of several regressions on wage of these factors, as well as the factor of 
being informally employed in itself, on wage. The regressions are in the forms of: 
(1) 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖
2 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
(2) 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖
2 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 +
𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑖𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
(3) (5)  (6) 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖
2 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 +
𝜃′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
(4) 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖
2 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐹-
𝑖𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑖𝑁5𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑖𝑌𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑍 + 𝜖𝑖 
where the i subscript denotes the individual and 𝜃′is a vector containing the control 
variables age, marital status, head of household dummy, and province fixed effects. 
Regressions 1 and 2 are run without the variable Migrant to show the coefficient 
estimates in the larger sample. Regressions 3, 5, and 6 use the same model, but are run on 
the total, male, and female samples, respectively, to estimate the effects of the non-
interaction variables on different samples. Additionally, the samples used in these 
regressions is only from the Uruguay ENHA, as wage data was not available in the 
NPHDC.  
Initial iterations of the regressions show a high level of heteroscedasticity. To 
help remedy this, robust standard errors are used. 
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Table 7                                              Dependent Variable: Income (Uruguayan Pesos) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES With Minority With Minority 
& Interactions 
With Minority 
& Migrant 
With 
Interactions 
Males Females 
       
Informal -4,536*** -5,177*** -4,765*** -5,411*** -5,395*** -3,723*** 
 (29.23) (41.47) (57.88) (82.67) (82.10) (74.88) 
Female -765.5*** -810.4*** -772.4*** -1,076***   
 (34.93) (114.7) (68.47) (227.3)   
Number of Children 
under 5 
-10.17 69.29 16.44 175.8* 106.5 -156.0** 
 (38.24) (50.78) (74.34) (104.7) (109.9) (78.38) 
Yrs of School -180.1*** -190.8*** -175.2*** -182.6*** -279.8*** -123.9* 
 (28.08) (27.28) (57.04) (55.28) (89.81) (67.45) 
Yrs of School2 21.33*** 25.13*** 20.39*** 23.26*** 28.60*** 15.98*** 
 (1.847) (1.989) (3.738) (3.991) (6.083) (4.168) 
Minority -168.5*** -197.6*** -97.92 -183.3* -131.8 -48.76 
 (34.46) (48.92) (69.34) (94.89) (95.90) (94.98) 
Migrant   598.6 960.2 985.9 3.100 
   (437.1) (765.0) (763.0) (262.0) 
Female*Informal  1,697***  1,710***   
  (58.93)  (114.7)   
Female*N5  -194.9***  -413.0***   
  (67.04)  (124.9)   
Female*YrsSchool  -116.9***  -82.98***   
  (15.86)  (31.43)   
Female*Minority  52.36  194.6   
  (62.93)  (131.5)   
Female*Migrant    -923.5   
    (807.5)   
Constant 5,695*** 5,890*** 5,946*** 6,177*** 6,646*** 4,370*** 
 (113.3) (109.7) (231.6) (224.5) (342.3) (290.9) 
       
Observations 92,819 92,819 23,732 23,732 14,132 9,600 
R-squared 0.263 0.272 0.272 0.280 0.266 0.301 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Not surprisingly, the coefficient on Informal is negative in all cases and of the 
magnitude of at least 3,700 Uruguayan pesos (approximately 152 dollars) per month. 
This means that if an individual works in the informal sector, despite accounting for 
education, number of young children, and minority and migrant status, their income is 
still expected to be much lower than that of formal sector employees. This result is very 
similar to past analyses on the wages of informal sector employees (Funkhouser, 1996; 
Beccaria and Groisman, 2008). This reason is one of several why we care about 
identifying factors that predict propensity to work in the informal sector: if women of 
disadvantaged backgrounds have an increasingly higher probability of being employed in 
the informal sector, they then have a much higher probability of earning lower wages. In 
this analysis, being female is also associated with lower wages, which is consistent with 
previous literature on male-female wage differentials (Funkhouser, 1996). 
 However, despite informal and female both having negative coefficients, the 
coefficient on the interaction between being female and an informal worker is positive, 
meaning that informally employed women have less of a wage penalty on their informal 
employment than do informally employed men. This same trend can be seen in the 
gender-specific regressions—the coefficient of Informal in the male regression is -5,395 
pesos, while the coefficient in the female regression is of a lesser magnitude at -3,723 
pesos. This could be an explanatory factor for why a higher percentage of men are 
employed in the formal sector—the wage penalty for being an informal employee is 
higher for men than for women, which could incentivize more men to seek employment 
in the formal sector. However, the magnitude of the wage penalty is still high for women, 
suggesting that there would still be an incentive for women to seek employment in the 
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formal sector for higher wages. The fact that there is still a much higher proportion of 
women working in the informal sector than men supports the idea that there are barriers 
to women moving to formal sector work (Funkhouser, 1996). 
 A surprising result in these regressions is that, for each, the coefficient on years of 
school is negative, significant at the 1% level. For the male and female separate 
regressions, the coefficient on males is -279.8 and the coefficient on females is -123.9, 
meaning that, for each additional year of school, men are expected to earn 279.8 pesos 
(approximately 11.50 dollars) less per month, and women are expected to earn 123.9 
pesos (approximately 5 dollars) less per month. The coefficient on years of school 
squared pushes back on this trend, but only increases the coefficient by the magnitude of 
around one dollar for each additional year of schooling, still leaving a rather significant 
negative impact. Additionally, when looking at the interaction between being female and 
years of school, the coefficient is negative when other interaction variables are controlled 
for. This means that, despite separate male and female regressions showing a great 
negative return to education for men, when other factors are included, women are 
experiencing a greater negative return to education. 
 This result goes against the intuition behind investing in education. In a basic 
human capital investment model, investment in an increased unit of education in the 
present translates into higher earnings in the future than if no investment in education had 
been made (Acemoglu). Other studies on informality and returns to education on wages 
have found positive effects of increased education on income (Funkhouser, 1996; Portes 
et. al. 1986). The reason why this trend is present in the data is unclear; it is theoretically 
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possible, but highly unlikely, that education does not translate into higher wages in 
Uruguay. It is also possible that wages are low and variable for the majority of the 
population, and that this is in tandem with low average education. 
 If the sample is restricted to those only with 12 years of schooling or higher (a 
high school diploma), the mean monthly wage becomes 4842.65 pesos and the standard 
deviation becomes 8451.12 pesos. This shows that, at high levels of education, wage is 
very variable. This trend is the same if the sample is restricted to those with at least 12 
year of schooling and a value in the informality metric—mean wage becomes 5610.95 
pesos a month while the standard deviation is 9440.16 pesos. Even among those who are 
in the labor force, variation in wage is high at high levels of education, which is likely 
why the model shows the effect of education to be negative. It is unclear why so many 
individuals that are in the labor force have a relatively high level of education and low 
earnings. Some possible explanations are that some individuals are engaged in work 
where they are receiving nonmonetary compensation, or that there are many people 
working only a few hours a week. 
 Although the number of children under 5 has no effect on wage for men, it has a 
significantly negative effect on wage for women, especially once other interaction 
variables are controlled for. As women tend to be primary caretakers of young children, 
this result makes sense. Women who are primary caretakers of young children likely have 
less time to devote to their jobs, which likely causes them to earn less per month from 
work. Although this analysis does not have data on hours worked, women with young 
children may be cutting their work hours to have additional time for caretaking. 
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 When migrant status is not controlled for, minority status has a significantly 
negative effect on wage for both men and women. However, there is no significant effect 
of the interaction term between being female and being a minority, suggesting that the 
effect of being a minority on wage is relatively the same for both men and women. When 
migrant status is included, Minority no longer becomes significant in most of the 
regressions, except for the interaction regression, where Minority remains significant at 
the 10% level. However, this is likely due to the change in sample when Migrant is 
factored in, as this same effect takes place when the same sample is regressed without 
including the variable Migrant. 
 Migrant status has no significant effect on wage for either men or women. This is 
not surprising, as Migrant is only included in the regressions where Minority is also 
included, and these two variables also canceled out each other’s effects in the regression 
on probability of informal work. We would expect migrants to have lower wages because 
they may have different levels of education, or may be working in more informal work 
environments. However, because these factors are also included in the regression, these 
effects are likely captured in the significant coefficients of YrsSchool and Informal. 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Reverse Causality 
 Reverse causality is possible with many of the variables included in this 
regression. For whether the individual is a head of household, reverse causality is less 
likely because this is usually the male or husband of the house, which is determined by 
societal norms. For marital status and number of children under 5, it is possible that the 
stability and increased income of a formal job increases the probability marriage and 
impacts fertility decisions in how many children one can afford to have. It is also possible 
that being an informal employee allows more flexibility to care for more children. 
 Formal or informal employment could also influence education levels in a similar 
fashion. On one hand, a formal employee may be incentivized to obtain higher levels of 
education to be eligible for higher rates of pay or promotions. Formal employees, earning 
more on average, may also be more likely to afford to pay for increased levels of 
education, but may also experience higher opportunity costs for taking time off to pursue 
education. Someone with a more flexible informal job may have more time to devote to 
obtaining higher education, although this explanation is likely less prevalent given the 
lower average education of those in the informal sector.  
4.2 Omitted Variable Bias 
 Several potentially causal factors for probability of informal employment are 
missing from this analysis. Some of these variables are difficult or impossible to observe 
in a household survey or census, such as individual motivation, cultural norms, societal 
norms, discrimination, and level of choice involved in employment decisions. This study 
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omits several observable variables that could influence informal work, such as languages 
spoken, experience, and spousal and children’s wages. This model also does not discern 
between those who are part-time workers, and those that are full-time. For this reason, 
this model does not account for all possible influencing factors on propensity to be 
informally employed and income. 
 Additionally, the large coefficients on the fixed effects for province and country 
suggest that there are omitted variables that influence the labor market and employment 
trends in specific areas. Some examples of potential missing variables are number of 
companies in area, gross income of area, urban or rural status, or even weather. 
4.3 Bias within the Sample 
 For regressions that included the variables Minority and Migrant, the sample size 
became more restricted as the regression became limited to only those individuals who 
had values for those variables, with Minority being available only in the ENHA and 
Migrant only available in 4th trimester data from the ENHA, together creating a much 
smaller sample. However, this smaller sample was still collected at random, suggesting 
that there is no selection bias. 
 It is possible that the metrics Informal and Income are biased due to 
underreporting. Informal workers that are engaging in illegal and/or “under-the-table” 
work may be incentivized to report themselves as labor force non-participants or zero-
income workers to survey authorities to avoid taxes or legal repercussions, which would 
bias the proportion and income of informal employees downward. 
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 Income data from the ENHA was extremely variable and regressions on income 
were found to be heteroskedastic. The returns on income from increased education were 
found to be negative, which is likely not representative of the actual impacts of education 
on income. This could be due to underreporting by those looking to avoid taxes in the 
informal sector, by overreporting in the formal or informal sectors of those who want to 
appear more successful or include other family members’ incomes in their report, or 
misestimation of income by both formal and informal sector employees. 
4.4 Minority, Migrant, and Loss of Significance 
With Minority and Migrant, initial regression analysis may at first suggest that 
neither variable is actually significant, as significance appears to disappear once the other 
variable is controlled for. However, the reduction in sample size is assumed to be much, 
if not most, of the reason why the significance of migrant status disappears, as its 
significance also disappears when the sample size is restricted but minority status is not 
included in the regression.9 Because of this, the regressions within the less restricted 
sample sizes are presumed to have a better explanation of the relationships between 
minorities, migrants, gender, and informal work. Minorities and migrants have been 
shown to have a higher likelihood of being employed in the informal sector in the 
literature (Portes et. al. 1986; Cantu, 2017), so it would be surprising to find no 
significant effect of these qualities in any of the regressions.  
For minorities, this study showed evidence of women having a higher likelihood 
of employment in the informal sector if they were non-white. As mentioned earlier, being 
                                                          
9 Results of the regression with Migrant on the restricted sample are shown in Appendix Table 8. 
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non-white may exacerbate attitudes of “inferiority” that formal employers display 
towards women looking to enter the formal sector, or this may also interact with lower 
levels of education that minority women tend to have to prevent them from entering 
higher-skill formal sectors of employment.   
 It is possible that the effect of being a migrant is heterogeneous between 
Argentina and Uruguay. Argentina is known for being “an immigrant receiver” and the 
main destination for migrants from other South American nations (Berg et. al., 2006). 
The significance of Migrant and the corresponding interaction term Female*Migrant may 
reflect an effect that is present in Argentina, which makes up the majority of the larger 
sample that the interaction term is regressed in. Once Minority is included in the 
regression, the sample is then only restricted to those in Uruguay, and the effect may 
simply be less present in that country, especially if there is less of a pervasive presence of 
migrants. Although the “migrant” question was only asked of a small portion of the 
respondents in the ENHA, the proportion of migrants of the respondents is much smaller 
than the proportion of migrants in the NPHDC, at only 1.86% compared to 4.23%. 
If Minority and Migrant in themselves have no significant impact on probability 
of being informally employed, this is likely because being a member of these groups is 
conflated with other qualities that predict probability of being informally employed, such 
as low educational attainment or other omitted variables.  
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5. Conclusion 
 The goal of this study was to observe the interaction effects between gender and 
number of children under 5, education, minority status, and migrant status on the 
probability of being informally employed and personal income to determine if there are 
heterogeneous effects for men and women. Females are, in themselves, more likely to be 
informal sector employees, a finding that supports previous research. 
 The interaction between gender and number of children under 5 showed evidence 
of an effect of the number of children under 5 on men, but not for women in being 
informally employed. For males, each additional child under 5 lowered the probability of 
informal employment by 2.4 percentage points, while each additional child had no effect 
in the female-only regressions and the interaction term with gender virtually canceled out 
the effect for males. This suggests that men have the option to seek more stable 
employment in the formal sector with the addition of young children, but women with 
young children face similar barriers to entering the formal sector as women without 
young children and are unable to move sectors as a response. 
 For the interaction between gender and education, females were found to have a 
greater effect of a one-year increase in schooling on lessening their probability of being 
informally employed. From the informal regression (11), the effect of one year of 
additional schooling had an additional effect of 2.3 percentage points on decreasing the 
probability of informal employment for women compared to men. This result supports 
the hypothesis that there are greater educational barriers for women entering the formal 
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sector, but also provides evidence that schooling can have a large impact on expanding 
women’s employment opportunities. 
 Minority women also had a significantly higher propensity to be employed in the 
informal sector, while being a minority had an insignificant or weakly significant 
negative effect on informal employment for men. Being a non-white increased the 
probability of a woman being employed in the informal sector by 3.8 percentage points, 
suggesting that race and negative prejudice against non-whites may conflate with existing 
barriers to women looking to enter the informal sector. 
 Migrant women have a 14-15 percentage point increase in their probability of 
being an informal sector employee, compared to migrant men, who have only a 2 
percentage point increase in their probability of working in the informal sector. This is 
evidence of the gendered structure in Latin America—women often migrate instead of 
men for opportunities—and indicative of the demand for migrant women in private 
household services, the most common sector of employment for female informal 
workers. While this sector may be providing women from other countries the chance to 
find better work opportunities than they have at home, it may be one of the only options 
for them once they arrive, as language, discriminatory, and legal barriers compound with 
existing barriers for females to create significant difficulties to moving into the formal 
sector.  
 In the evidence from the regressions on wage, employment in the informal sector 
results in significantly lower wages, even when controlling for other factors. Women in 
the informal sector still receive a negative penalty on their wages, but less so than men. 
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This may suggest that men have an increased monetary incentive to move away from the 
informal sector, which may be enabled by the nature of the formal sectors that hire men, 
like manufacturing, and their lesser barriers for entry. 
 The interaction of female on number of children under 5 had an additional 
negative penalty to wage, while it had no effect on men, suggesting that more young 
children significantly influences the number of hours or level of work that a woman is 
able to engage in, but not men. The interactions between female and minority status, as 
well as female and migrant status, had no significant impact on wage. Minority status on 
its own had a significant negative effect on income, suggesting homogeneous effects for 
both women and men.  
 Both sets of regressions support this notion that there are heterogeneous impacts 
of personal characteristics on the propensity to be informally employed for men and 
women. Although other fields of study have focused on the intersectionality of women’s 
informal employment, economics has tended to sail past further characterization of the 
sector and explore more macro-scale questions, such as whether the informal sector is 
necessarily one of refuge employment. However, women are a heterogeneous group in 
themselves, and a deeper study into the nuance behind women’s informal labor and how 
it is impacted by additional factors can help explain the barriers that exist in the formal 
labor market, and inform this ongoing conversation about whether the informal sector 
employment is really where women and men are “choosing” to work in Latin America. 
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6. Appendix 
Appendix Table 1 
Unpaired t-test results for differences in total and Informal metric samples 
   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total N Informal N Total 
Sample 
Mean 
Informal 
Metric 
Mean 
Difference 
      
Racial Minority 255,978 92,824 .1259 .1187 .0072*** 
(.0013) 
Migrant Status 3,690,112 659,692 .0419 .0584 -.0165*** 
(.0003) 
 
Appendix Table 2 
T-test results for differences in age for migrant and native 
samples 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLE Native Mean Migrant Mean Difference 
    
Age 30.633 48.802 -18.169*** 
(.057) 
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Appendix Table 3 
Dependent variable: Informal=1, both genders 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Country 
Control 
Province 
Control 
Minority 
Included 
Migrant 
Included 
Minority & 
Migrant 
      
Uruguay 0.104***     
 (0.00183)     
Age 0.00176*** 0.00195*** 0.00424*** 0.00159*** 0.00484*** 
 (5.36e-05) (5.34e-05) (0.000138) (5.67e-05) (0.000274) 
Female 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.0807*** 0.148*** 0.0774*** 
 (0.00129) (0.00128) (0.00355) (0.00135) (0.00704) 
Number of 
Children under 5 
-0.0138*** -0.0173*** -0.00172 -0.0188*** -0.0145** 
 (0.00104) (0.00104) (0.00342) (0.00108) (0.00694) 
Married -0.0470*** -0.0482*** -0.0301*** -0.0478*** -0.0297*** 
 (0.00139) (0.00138) (0.00435) (0.00144) (0.00869) 
Consensual 
Union 
-0.0550*** -0.0512*** -0.0377*** -0.0591*** -0.0404*** 
 (0.00402) (0.00400) (0.00485) (0.00772) (0.00961) 
Separated -0.0170*** -0.0167***  -0.0147***  
 (0.00366) (0.00364)  (0.00366)  
Divorced -0.0422*** -0.0370*** -0.0157** -0.0359*** -0.0275* 
 (0.00318) (0.00316) (0.00789) (0.00338) (0.0157) 
Widowed 0.000204 0.000983 -0.00109 0.00419 -0.0158 
 (0.00382) (0.00379) (0.0106) (0.00399) (0.0209) 
Yrs of School -0.0386*** -0.0360*** -0.0352*** -0.0358*** -0.0345*** 
 (0.000145) (0.000149) (0.000453) (0.000156) (0.000915) 
Head of HH -0.0416*** -0.0398*** -0.0358*** -0.0412*** -0.0383*** 
 (0.00138) (0.00137) (0.00380) (0.00144) (0.00756) 
Minority   0.00442  0.00287 
   (0.00466)  (0.00926) 
Migrant    0.0771*** 0.0361* 
    (0.00250) (0.0214) 
Constant 0.791*** 0.691*** 0.684*** 0.689*** 0.663*** 
 (0.00252) (0.00327) (0.00757) (0.00341) (0.0151) 
      
Observations 729,091 729,091 92,819 659,690 23,732 
R-squared 0.126 0.139 0.133 0.135 0.132 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Column 1 uses “country” for location, while Columns 2-5 use “province” indicators.  
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Appendix Table 4 
Dependent variable: Informal=1, Males 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Without Minority 
Included 
Migrant Included Minority & 
Migrant 
     
Age 0.00280*** 0.00510*** 0.00248*** 0.00562*** 
 (6.92e-05) (0.000182) (7.35e-05) (0.000362) 
Number of Children 
under 5 
-0.0136*** -0.00147 -0.0150*** -0.0139 
 (0.00129) (0.00449) (0.00133) (0.00914) 
Married -0.0767*** -0.0745*** -0.0758*** -0.0710*** 
 (0.00192) (0.00658) (0.00199) (0.0132) 
Consensual Union -0.0735*** -0.0703*** -0.0835*** -0.0745*** 
 (0.00518) (0.00693) (0.00994) (0.0138) 
Separated -0.0600***  -0.0571***  
 (0.00541)  (0.00544)  
Divorced -0.0396*** -0.0150 -0.0418*** -0.0290 
 (0.00464) (0.0124) (0.00492) (0.0252) 
Widowed -0.0489*** -0.0210 -0.0503*** -0.0502 
 (0.00682) (0.0199) (0.00715) (0.0399) 
Yrs of School -0.0267*** -0.0272*** -0.0266*** -0.0269*** 
 (0.000195) (0.000616) (0.000203) (0.00125) 
Head of HH -0.0415*** -0.0154*** -0.0442*** -0.0186 
 (0.00194) (0.00588) (0.00202) (0.0117) 
Minority  -0.00167  0.00165 
  (0.00617)  (0.0122) 
Migrant   0.0206*** 0.0323 
   (0.00341) (0.0298) 
Constant 0.603*** 0.600*** 0.613*** 0.582*** 
 (0.00422) (0.00975) (0.00438) (0.0194) 
     
Observations 454,711 55,450 413,204 14,132 
R-squared 0.092 0.103 0.081 0.106 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 5 
Dependent variable: Informal=1, Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Without Minority 
Included 
Migrant Included Minority & 
Migrant 
     
Age 0.000168** 0.00271*** -0.000196** 0.00341*** 
 (8.28e-05) (0.000212) (8.77e-05) (0.000421) 
Number of Children 
under 5 
-0.0151*** 0.00416 -0.0170*** -0.00906 
 (0.00180) (0.00525) (0.00188) (0.0107) 
Married -0.00322 0.0102 -0.00367* 0.00684 
 (0.00211) (0.00642) (0.00220) (0.0128) 
Consensual Union -0.0283*** -0.00672 -0.0322*** -0.00558 
 (0.00624) (0.00734) (0.0120) (0.0146) 
Separated 0.00550  0.00668  
 (0.00476)  (0.00479)  
Divorced -0.0279*** -0.00802 -0.0266*** -0.0168 
 (0.00419) (0.0101) (0.00450) (0.0199) 
Widowed 0.0173*** 0.0183 0.0196*** 0.00794 
 (0.00454) (0.0126) (0.00477) (0.0249) 
Yrs of School -0.0509*** -0.0460*** -0.0504*** -0.0448*** 
 (0.000227) (0.000659) (0.000239) (0.00133) 
Head of HH -0.0135*** -0.0219*** -0.0123*** -0.0275** 
 (0.00225) (0.00618) (0.00237) (0.0123) 
Minority  0.0144**  0.00338 
  (0.00703)  (0.0140) 
Migrant   0.141*** 0.0315 
   (0.00356) (0.0301) 
Constant 1.009*** 0.893*** 0.994*** 0.864*** 
 (0.00502) (0.0119) (0.00529) (0.0241) 
     
Observations 274,380 37,369 246,486 9,600 
R-squared 0.211 0.189 0.216 0.182 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table 6 
Dependent Variable: Informal=1, Includes Interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Children 
Interaction 
Education 
Interaction 
Minority 
Interaction 
Migrant 
Interaction 
     
Age 0.00194*** 0.00185*** 0.00424*** 0.00163*** 
 (5.34e-05) (5.32e-05) (0.000138) (5.67e-05) 
Female 0.139*** 0.368*** 0.0759*** 0.140*** 
 (0.00135) (0.00306) (0.00374) (0.00138) 
Children under 5 -0.0240*** -0.0164*** -0.00174 -0.0187*** 
 (0.00122) (0.00104) (0.00342) (0.00108) 
Married -0.0485*** -0.0514*** -0.0299*** -0.0479*** 
 (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00435) (0.00144) 
Consensual Union -0.0512*** -0.0524*** -0.0373*** -0.0593*** 
 (0.00400) (0.00398) (0.00485) (0.00771) 
Separated -0.0171*** -0.0255***  -0.0155*** 
 (0.00364) (0.00362)  (0.00366) 
Divorced -0.0370*** -0.0392*** -0.0154* -0.0359*** 
 (0.00316) (0.00315) (0.00789) (0.00337) 
Widowed 0.00165 -0.0218*** -0.000661 0.00314 
 (0.00379) (0.00379) (0.0106) (0.00399) 
Yrs of School -0.0360*** -0.0271*** -0.0352*** -0.0356*** 
 (0.000149) (0.000184) (0.000453) (0.000156) 
Head of HH -0.0381*** -0.0379*** -0.0366*** -0.0407*** 
 (0.00138) (0.00137) (0.00381) (0.00144) 
Female*Children 
under 5 
0.0227***    
 (0.00216)    
Female*Yrs   -0.0229***   
  (0.000283)   
Minority   -0.0106*  
   (0.00593)  
Female*Minority   0.0382***  
   (0.00931)  
Migrant    0.0211*** 
    (0.00330) 
Female*Migrant    0.128*** 
    (0.00493) 
Constant 0.693*** 0.613*** 0.686*** 0.688*** 
 (0.00327) (0.00339) (0.00758) (0.00341) 
     
Observations 729,091 729,091 92,819 659,690 
R-squared 0.139 0.147 0.133 0.135 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
*The table above shows the female informality regressions only on individuals that have 
a value for Minority to show the effects of running the regressions on just the smaller 
sample. This sample includes only respondents from Uruguay. In this smaller sample, 
Minority is significant on its own at the 5% level, Migrant is not significant on its own, 
and neither are significant when included together in the sample. In the larger sample 
(Table 6 in body), Minority is significant at the 10% level when included on its own, 
Migrant is significant at the 1% level when on its own, yet neither are significant when 
included together.  
 
Migrant is much more significant in the larger sample, which is the sample that also 
includes Argentina. The reason why the sample is so small for the migration metric in 
Uruguay is that the migration questions were only asked in the fourth trimester of the 
survey. Data was still collected at random and have respondents from all localities, but it 
is a far smaller sample of respondents. Because the sample decreases so greatly and 
Migrant is not significant in the small sample at all, it is inferred that the loss of 
significance when both minority and migration status are controlled for is partially caused 
by this drop in sample size. 
  
Appendix Table 7    
Dependent variable: Informal=1, Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Without 
Minority & 
Migrant 
With Minority With Migrant With Minority 
& Migrant 
Children Under 5 0.00443 0.00416 -0.00903 -0.00906 
 (0.00524) (0.00525) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
Yrs of School -0.0462*** -0.0460*** -0.0448*** -0.0448*** 
 (0.000654) (0.000659) (0.00132) (0.00133) 
Minority  0.0144**  0.00338 
  (0.00703)  (0.0140) 
Migrant   0.0316 0.0315 
   (0.0301) (0.0301) 
Constant 0.898*** 0.893*** 0.865*** 0.864*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0237) (0.0241) 
     
Observations 37,369 37,369 9,600 9,600 
R-squared 0.189 0.189 0.182 0.182 
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Appendix Table 8   
Dependent variable: Informal=1, Includes Interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N5 & Yrs Only 
(Whole Metric 
Sample) 
Migrant 
Included 
Migrant & 
Minority 
Included 
    
Female 0.363*** 0.371*** 0.213*** 
 (0.00308) (0.00330) (0.0171) 
Children under 5 -0.0235*** -0.0243*** -0.0264*** 
 (0.00121) (0.00125) (0.00850) 
Yrs of School -0.0272*** -0.0266*** -0.0275*** 
 (0.000184) (0.000192) (0.00118) 
Female*N5 0.0241*** 0.0228*** 0.0339*** 
 (0.00215) (0.00225) (0.0131) 
Female*Yrs -0.0229*** -0.0237*** -0.0162*** 
 (0.000283) (0.000297) (0.00173) 
Migrant  0.0256*** 0.0348 
  (0.00329) (0.0289) 
Female*Migrant  0.108*** -0.00650 
  (0.00491) (0.0427) 
Minority   7.67e-05 
   (0.0118) 
Female*Minority   0.00501 
   (0.0186) 
Constant 0.615*** 0.611*** 0.606*** 
 (0.00339) (0.00354) (0.0163) 
    
Observations 729,091 659,690 23,732 
R-squared 0.147 0.144 0.136 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
*The table above shows the regressions with multiple interaction variables on the 
probability of being an informal worker, in order of restricting sample size. The first 
regression contains the sample without Minority or Migrant, the second contains 
Minority, and the third contains both Migrant and Minority. In this regression, both 
Female*N5 and Female*Yrs interactions remain significant in all regressions, and their 
magnitude remains relatively similar, with the same signs. However, Female*Migrant is 
no longer significant once Minority is controlled for. Based on the sample size of those 
that include both Minority and Migrant and the fact that it only represents a small portion 
of the entire Uruguay sample, it is likely that this significance of Migrant and 
Female*Migrant becomes no longer significant due to this change in the sample size.  
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Appendix Table 9 
Dependent variable: Informal=1 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Interactions 
with Education 
and Minority 
  
Age 0.00427*** 
 (0.000138) 
Female 0.225*** 
 (0.00852) 
Number of 
Children under 5 
-0.000522 
 (0.00341) 
Married -0.0342*** 
 (0.00435) 
Consensual Union -0.0401*** 
 (0.00484) 
Divorced -0.0199** 
 (0.00788) 
Widowed -0.0175* 
 (0.0106) 
Yrs of School -0.0280*** 
 (0.000584) 
Head of HH -0.0326*** 
 (0.00380) 
Female*Yrs -0.0169*** 
 (0.000863) 
Minority -0.00363 
 (0.00593) 
Female*Minority 0.0204** 
 (0.00934) 
Constant 0.625*** 
 (0.00819) 
  
Observations 92,819 
R-squared 0.137 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
*This table reports the result of a regression on Informal with the inclusion of 
Female*Minority, Minority, and Female*YrsSchool. It shows that Minority no longer is 
significant, but Female*Minority remains significant at the 5% level when 
Female*YrsSchool is controlled for. 
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Appendix Table 10 
Dependent variable: Informal=1 
 (1) 
VARIABLES All Variables 
and Interactions 
  
Age 0.00483*** 
 (0.000274) 
Female 0.213*** 
 (0.0171) 
Children Under 5 -0.0264*** 
 (0.00850) 
Married -0.0324*** 
 (0.00869) 
Consensual Union -0.0403*** 
 (0.00962) 
Divorced -0.0300* 
 (0.0157) 
Widowed -0.0312 
 (0.0210) 
Yrs of School -0.0275*** 
 (0.00118) 
Head of HH -0.0332*** 
 (0.00760) 
Female*N5 0.0339*** 
 (0.0131) 
Female*Yrs -0.0162*** 
 (0.00173) 
Migrant 0.0348 
 (0.0289) 
Female*Migrant -0.00650 
 (0.0427) 
Minority 7.67e-05 
 (0.0118) 
Female*Minority 0.00501 
 (0.0186) 
Constant 0.606*** 
 (0.0163) 
  
Observations 23,732 
R-squared 0.136 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
*The table above shows the results of the regressions on Informal when all of the 
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interaction variables are included together. The interactions Female*Children Under 5 
and Female*Yrs of School remain significant, while Female*Minority and 
Female*Migrant are no longer significant. This reduction in significance is likely related 
to the decrease in sample size, as other tables in this Appendix show a reduction in 
significance on Minority when sample is restricted, but Migrant is not controlled for. 
